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THE INFLUENCE OF COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING ON TEACHERS' SALARIES 
IN NEW YORK STATE 
DAVID B. LIPSKY and JOHN E. DROTNING 
WHAT impact, if any, has teacher unionism had on teachers' salaries? 
Others have asked this question, but to 
date research results have been incon-
sistent.1 In part, this may be attributed 
to different research designs and meth-
ods; but whatever the reasons for the 
This study tests a model of teacher salary 
determination with data describing several 
aspects of all school districts in New York state, 
outside of New York City. The authors find 
that collective bargaining is not significant in 
explaining variations in 1968 teacher salaries 
among all school districts, but bargaining did 
have a significant effect among small districts 
and on the rate of salary change from 1967 to 
1968. On the whole, however, the authors con-
clude that the results of this and other studies 
show that bargaining has had a suprisingly 
minor effect on teacher salaries. 
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inconsistencies, the relationship between 
teacher unionism and salaries is not yet 
completely clear.2 
This paper analyzes the influence of 
collective negotiations on teacher salaries 
in New York state in the first year in 
which the Taylor Law, governing public 
employer-employee relations, was in ef-
1
 Four principal studies have been published 
during the past three years. They are, Hirschel 
Rasper, "The Effects of Collective Bargaining on 
Public School Teachers' Salaries," Industrial and 
Labor Relations Review, Vol. 24, No. 1 (October 
1970), pp. 57-72; Robert N. Baird and John H. 
Landon, "The Effects of Collective Bargaining 
on Public School Teachers' Salaries: Comment," 
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 25, 
No. 3 (April 1972), pp. 410-416; Robert J. 
Thornton, "The Effects of Collective Negotia-
tions on Teachers' Salaries," Quarterly Review 
of Economics and Business, Vol. 11, No. 4 
(Winter 1971), pp. 37-46; and W. Clayton Hall 
and Norman E. Carroll, "The Effects of 
Teachers' Organizations on Salaries and Class 
Size," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 
Vol. 26, No. 2 (January 1973), pp. 834-841. See 
also, Hirschel Kasper, "On the Effect of Collec-
tive Bargaining on Resource Allocation in Pub-
lic Schools," Economic and Business Bulletin, 
Vol. 23, No. 3 (Spring-Summer 1971), pp. 1-9. 
2 Three significant studies that deal with de-
terminants of teacher salaries (but not with the 
effect of collective bargaining) are Henry M. 
Levin, "A Cost-Effectiveness Analysis of Teacher 
Selection," Journal of Human Resources, Vol. 5, 
No. 1 (Winter 1970), pp. 24-33; John D. Owen, 
"Toward a Public Employment Wage Theory: 
Econometric Evidence on Teacher Quality," 
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 25, 
No. 2 (January 1972), pp. 213-222; and John H. 
Landon and Robert N. Baird, "Monopsony in 
the Market for Public School Teachers," Ameri-
can Economic Review, Vol. 61, No. 5 (December 
1971), pp. 966-971. 
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feet.3 Many economists believe that the 
union's impact on wages is likely to be 
greatest in the initial stages of organiza-
tion. More than forty years ago, Paul 
Douglas concluded, 
Unionism, in other words, very probably 
does give an appreciable increase in earnings 
during the early period of effective organiza-
tion, but during the later and more mature 
years of union development, the relative 
rate of further progress seems, to say the 
least, to be no more rapid on the whole for 
unionists than for non-unionists.4 
Thus, the passage of the Taylor Law 
in 1967 presents a unique opportunity 
for a study of the type undertaken here. 
Most New York school districts entered 
bargaining for the first time in the 
spring of 1968. Information for 696 dis-
tricts reveals that about 63 percent 
signed collective agreements in 1968. All 
but a handful had never been organized 
for bargaining before the passage of the 
Taylor Law.5 
Did New York districts with collective 
bargaining contracts in 1968 have signifi-
cantly higher salaries than districts with-
out contracts? Did organized districts 
win larger salary increases than districts 
not yet organized? In answering these 
basic questions, this study also sheds 
3 For a thorough discussion of the Taylor 
Law, see Walter E. Oberer, Kurt L. Hanslowe, 
and Robert E. Doherty, The Taylor Act Amend-
ments of 1969: A Supplemental Primer for 
School Personnel (And Others Interested in 
Collective Negotiations) (Ithaca, New York: New 
York State School of Industrial and Labor Rela-
tions, 1970). 
* Paul H. Douglas, Real Wages in the United 
States, 1890-1926 (Boston and New York: 
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1930), p. 564. 
s New York City is not included in this study. 
New York City is obviously exceptional in many 
ways. For example, although only one of more 
than 700 districts in the state, it has more than 
one quarter of all pupils enrolled in the state 
and spends approximately 30 percent of all 
money expended on primary and secondary pub-
lic education. 
light on other factors that influence the 
determination of teacher salaries. 
Preliminary Analysis 
Table 1 shows differences in salary 
levels between districts with contracts in 
1968-69 (441) and districts without con-
tracts (255). Teachers are normally paid 
according to a salary schedule based on 
two factors: years of experience and col-
lege credit hours earned beyond the 
bachelor's degree. Data were gathered 
for three salary points in the schedule 
for each New York district: (1) the 
salary paid to first-year teachers with 
only a bachelor's degree (Base or BS 
minimum) ; (2) the salary paid to a 
teacher with seven years of experience 
and thirty hours of earned credit beyond 
the bachelor's degree (BS + 30, 7 th 
Step) ; and (3) the salary paid to a 
teacher with eleven years of experience 
and sixty hours of earned credit beyond 
the bachelor's degree (BS + 60, 11th 
Step). 
These three salary points give a rep-
resentative picture of the salary schedule 
in each district.6 Note that these salary 
figures may not represent the average 
salary actually paid in any given district, 
for that depends on the placement of 
teachers within the schedule, i.e., the 
characteristics of the specific teacher 
work force in terms of experience and 
earned credits. Yet the use of the teacher 
salary scale is particularly appropriate, 
since this is normally the subject of di-
rect negotiation in collective bargaining. 
In addition, however, information was 
obtained on the mean salary actually 
8 For some purposes, the Public Employment 
Relations Board uses these points as a shorthand 
for describing a given teacher salary schedule. 
In a sense, these points describe a "normal" 
career path for a teacher. 
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Table 1. Difference in Salary Levels ] 
with and without Collective B; 
Districts with Contracts 
{N = 441) 
Salary Level Standard 
Mean Deviation 
U) (2) 
Base salary $ 6 , 4 8 5 $ 275.9 
BS + 30, 7th step 9,091 615.8 
B S + 60, 11th step 10,931 1,166.0 
Mean salary 8,539 1,093.6 
paid in each district in 1968.7 Average 
salaries are not likely to be the direct 
subject of collective negotiations, but 
they are a measure of actual compensa-
tion received by teachers and therefore 
are useful in judging the real economic 
benefit of unionism. 
In previous studies, both salary scales 
and mean salaries have been analyzed— 
but never in the same study. The differ-
ences between the two types of measure 
are important: later, it will be shown 
that, in certain respects, the determi-
nants of the salary scale are different 
than the determinants of average salary. 
Table 1 indicates that there were in-
deed differences in salaries at all levels 
between districts with and without con-
tracts. This, however, does not take one 
very far. First, the salary differences be-
tween districts are not very large: from 
about one percent ($65) at base to 2.24 
percent ($240) at the BS + 60, 11th 
Step. Second, of course, we are not con-
trolling for any other variables influenc-
ing teacher salaries. 
It is possible, for example, that or-
ganized districts had always been higher-
paying districts and that high salaries 
lead to organization, rather than the re-
verse. In fact, it is true that districts or-
t Unfortunately, we were not able to obtain 
mean salary figures for all districts in earlier 
years. 
/een New York School Districts 
ining Contracts, 1968-69. 
Districts without Contracts 
( J V -
Mean 
(3) 
$ 6,420 
8,943 
10,691 
8,385 
•• 255) 
Standard 
Deviations 
(4) 
$ 299.1 
652.0 
1,016.5 
1,190.4 
(/) 
Percentage 
Difference 
i -(3) -=- (3) 
(5) 
1.01 
1.65 
2.24 
1.84 
ganized in 1968 had tended to pay 
higher salaries in 1967 than unorganized 
districts, but these differences in 1967 
were much smaller than those existing 
in 1968, ranging from $25 at base to 
$125 at the BS + 60, 11th Step. This 
implies that unionism did produce 
salary gains for teachers in 1968, as 
Table 1 suggests, but clearly this hypo-
thesis needs a more rigorous testing that 
allows for the effect of other determi-
nants of teacher salaries. 
A Model of Salary Determination for 
Public School Teachers 
In a perfectly competitive labor mar-
ket—where there are no barriers to 
worker mobility, and workers and em-
ployers possess no monopoly power with 
respect to wages—workers in the same 
occupation, possessing the same level of 
skill and having all other relevant char-
acteristics (experience, age, sex, etc.) in 
common, should receive the same wage. 
Intraoccupational wage differentials will 
exist if any of the above conditions are 
not met. For example, similar jobs may 
involve different levels of effort with dif-
ferent employers. Second, the assumption 
of a homogeneous labor supply is 
usually violated in the real world. 
Workers possess different levels of skill 
and experience, and wage levels can be 
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expected to reflect these differences. 
Third, workers are not optimally mo-
bile; movement is not without cost. 
Moreover, workers may also be tied to 
their jobs by nonwage considerations, 
such as preferences for certain work 
settings, satisfaction with present work 
associations, etc. Fourth, other market 
imperfections may also exist. Employers 
may not be "price takers"; rather they 
may possess some monopsony power. 
Workers may also exercise monopoly 
power. Different market structures will 
cause wage differences to occur within 
the same occupation. 
The model used in this study to ex-
plain differences in teacher salaries is 
derived from these considerations. One 
must first consider the fact that "teach-
ing" involves different duties in different 
districts, so the quality of the position will 
vary. The pupil-teacher ratio (P/T) is 
one measure of difference in the quality 
of jobs available to teachers. Although 
there may be better measures, differences 
in average class size are common indi-
cators of quality differences in schools.8 
The use of P/T, however, can be 
perilous. As Hall and Carroll have 
pointed out, teachers often bargain just 
as hard for class size limitations as for 
higher salaries.9 Salaries and pupil-
teacher ratios may be determined simul-
taneously through bargaining. Neverthe-
less, P/T will be used as an independent 
8
 The "quality" of a school has been meas-
ured by student achievement test scores, per-
centage of college entrants, and similar indices. 
See William E. Barron, "Measurement of Edu-
cational Productivity," in Warren E. Gauerke and 
Jack R. Childress, eds., The Theory and Prac-
tice of School Finance (Chicago: Rand McNally 
& Co., 1967), pp. 279-309. The pupil-teacher 
ratio may be more subject to control by school 
administrators than other quality indices. 
9 Hall and Carroll, "The Effects of Teachers' 
Organizations on Salaries and Class Size." 
variable in the analysis, because in the 
first year of bargaining under the Taylor 
Law, class size was not a major issue. 
Even in 1970, according to the New 
York State Teachers Association 
(NYSTA), only 255 districts in New 
York had contracts containing any sort 
of class size provision, and the great 
majority of these were simple statements 
of intent that were not binding on the 
school district.10 
In another sense, class size is a double-
edged variable: Kasper, for example, 
implicitly considers P/T a measure of 
teacher productivity.11 If a low P/T is 
an indication of a high-quality district, 
one would expect a negative relationship 
between P/T and salaries. On the other 
hand, if one expects a correlation be-
tween salaries and physical productivity, 
as measured by class size, then there 
should be a positive relationship be-
tween P/T and salaries. In addition, if 
teachers prefer smaller to larger classes, 
the relationship might be positive, indi-
cating that teachers are compensated for 
the disutility of larger workloads. 
Another measure of difference in the 
quality of districts may be the district's 
enrollment. Total enrollment, E, may 
reflect both differences in quality and 
differences in market structures, as Kas-
per has pointed out.12 Larger districts 
may have more specialized programs 
(art, music, special education, etc.) re-
quiring teachers of higher skill levels. 
Larger districts, especially those in the 
affluent s u b u r b s , m a y h a v e b r i g h t e r s tu-
rn New York State Teachers Association, In-
formation Service Memorandum, November 30, 
1970. 
n Kasper, "On the Effect of Collective Bar-
gaining on Resource Allocation in Public 
Schools." 
i2 Kasper, "The Effects of Collective Bargain-
ing on Public School Teachers' Salaries," p . 63. 
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dents and conduct more enriched pro-
grams. Moreover, larger districts are 
likely to be in or near metropolitan 
areas where competition for teachers 
may be keen. Conversely, smaller dis-
tricts may have more monopsony power, 
because, as Kasper puts it, "There may 
be no nearby school districts to stimu-
late competition."13 Thus, we expect 
there to be a positive relation between 
enrollment, E, and salaries. 
At the same time, one does not expect 
district size and salaries to be linearly 
related. This is partly based on Rasper's 
finding of an "urban turnaround." " In 
the very largest urban school districts, 
teachers may need skills less of a peda-
gogic than of a disciplinary variety. 
Moreover, large city school districts may 
need to compete more intensely with 
other public services (welfare, transpor-
tation, sanitation, etc.) for a piece of the 
taxpayer's dollar.15 
It might be argued that teachers pre-
fer to work in smaller districts, and, 
therefore, larger districts must pay 
higher salaries to entice teachers away 
from preferred smaller districts. Dis-
utilities may result from working in 
larger districts because of a more imper-
sonal atmosphere, the encumbrances of 
a large bureaucracy, and disciplinary 
problems. Many of the larger districts 
in New York state, however, are subur-
ban communities offering highly attrac-
tive working conditions much coveted 
by teachers. If disutilities result in 
higher salaries, the highest salaries 
should be found in central city districts 
that reputedly have the least attractive 
jobs. Consequently, the expected "urban 
turnaround" would not materialize. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid. 
Salary Schedule and Teacher 
Characteristics 
The next elements of our model relate 
to differences in teacher characteristics. 
Districts differ in the mix of teachers on 
their staffs. Salary schedules usually re-
quire districts to pay higher salaries to 
teachers with more experience or more 
earned college credits; therefore, one 
would expect a positive relation between, 
for example, mean salary and the per-. 
centage of teachers in a district with 
advanced degrees (Master's or better); 
this variable will be labeled ADV. 
Some interesting questions arise, how-
ever, when one considers the relation 
between points on the salary schedule 
and teacher characteristics. For example, 
does a district with a high ADV neces-
sarily have a high base salary? The 
hypothesis here is that a district desiring 
high-quality teachers (as measured by 
ADV) will tend to pay high salaries at 
every point in the salary schedule in 
order to recruit and retain high-quality 
teachers, regardless of degree level. 
The teacher experience variable tested 
in our model is the percentage of teach-
ers in a district with three years of 
seniority or less (SEN 3). This form is 
chosen for several reasons. For example, 
it can be argued that districts that re-
cruit heavily (and thus have a high 
SEN 3) will tend to shift the entire 
salary schedule upward in order to at-
tract young teachers not only by a high 
base salary but by the promise of sub-
stantial increments throughout their 
careers, especially since the full cost im-
pact of this shift will not be felt imme-
diately. Districts with low salary sched-
ules may suffer from high turnover. Since 
younger workers are usually the most 
mobile, high turnover may result in a 
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low SEN 3.16 Hence, SEN 3 and salaries 
would be positively correlated. 
On the other hand, one would not 
expect a positive relation between sala-
ries actually paid by districts (for exam-
ple, mean salaries) and SEN 3, because 
of the requirements of the salary sched-
ule. A district with a teaching staff with 
extensive experience will necessarily 
tend to pay higher actual salaries (as op-
posed to salaries listed in the schedule). 
Therefore, it is expected that mean 
salary and SEN 3 will be negatively 
related. 
The preceding discussion highlights 
the possible uses of a teacher salary 
schedule. A district can adjust a schedule 
to show, for example, relatively high 
salaries at the base level but relatively 
low salaries at subsequent steps. If the 
district's teachers are employed mainly 
at the higher steps and no hiring is 
being done, the average salary actually 
paid by the district will tend to be lower 
than other districts with, possibly, a 
lower base salary but a different age-
distribution of teachers. Thus, the com-
mon practice of using the base salary as 
a comprehensive index of a district's 
average salary level can be quite mis-
leading.17 Both administrators and 
teacher organizations can manipulate 
the salary schedule to serve various pur-
poses^—public relations, politics, recruit-
ing, etc. 
Some degree of monopsony is likely 
to exist in teacher labor markets.18 As 
" For an analysis of the relationship between 
turnover and the seniority distribution of em-
ployed workers, see, Vladimir Stoikov, "The 
Effect of Changes in Quits and Hires on the 
Length-of-Service Composition of Employed 
Workers," British Journal of Industrial Rela-
tions, Vol. 9, No. 2 (July 1972), pp. 225-233. 
i? Baird and Landon use only the base salary 
in their two studies. 
is This is true because a public school system 
obviously does not operate in a competitive prod-
pointed out above, the enrollment vari-
able is likely to pick up some monop-
sony effects. In addition, a dummy vari-
able, DWN, is added to the model to 
capture additional monopsony effects. 
(DWN takes a value of 1 if a district is 
in downstate New York, 0 otherwise.) 
Approximately one quarter of the state's 
districts are in the three downstate 
counties, Nassau, Suffolk, and West-
chester." An apparently substantial 
salary differential, favorable to down-
state teachers, has persisted in New 
York state over many years. There may 
be several reasons for this differential. 
The argument presented here is that the 
competitive market structure in the 
downstate counties is responsible for a 
large part of the differential. The down-
state districts are geographically more 
concentrated than New York's upstate 
districts. It is conceivable that a teacher 
living downstate can change jobs (and 
districts) many times without changing 
his place of residence. Most teachers 
living upstate who change jobs must also 
necessarily change residences. This 
means that the downstate teacher is 
potentially more job-mobile than the 
upstate teacher, and this gives the up-
state district a monopsonistic edge in the 
labor market.20 
uct market but has a virtual monopoly on the 
provision of educational services within a given 
geographic area. Thus, teachers are limited in 
the number of employers with whom they may 
deal. The most explicit discussion of the mo-
nopsony question is in Landon and Baird, "Mo-
nopsony in the Market for Public School Teach-
ers." 
io Arguably, Rockland might also be consid-
ered a downstate county. Since it has only nine 
districts, its inclusion or exclusion does not af-
fect the analysis to any great extent. 
2oThis is a generalization that pTObably does 
not hold for the Buffalo metropolitan area. 
There are forty-one districts in western New 
York (Erie and Niagara Counties) competing for 
teacher services. The next largest upstate county, 
Monroe (Rochester), has eighteen districts. 
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In addition, downstate districts must 
compete for teachers in a labor market 
that affords teachers many more oppor-
tunities outside the teaching profession 
than are available in upstate New York. 
In summary, the downstate market for 
teachers is likely to be significantly more 
competitive than the upstate market.21 
There are other possible, but less 
plausible, causes of the downstate differ-
ential. First, downstate districts tend to 
be wealthier than upstate districts, and, 
thus, their ability to pay higher salaries 
is greater. Wealth variables will be in-
corporated into the model.22 
Second, consumer prices are higher in 
the downstate area than upstate, and 
teacher salaries may reflect differences 
in living costs, but recent research indi-
cates that is unlikely.23 Also, there does 
not appear to be enough variation in 
the cost of living between upstate and 
downstate communities to produce the 
sizable downstate salary advantage. 
Third, some argue that strong teacher 
organizations in the downstate area, par-
ticularly in New York City, generate 
patterns that have lifted the salaries of 
all downstate districts, both organized 
and unorganized. Later, this study will 
correct for some of the pattern-spillover 
effects that apparently do exist in 
21 Landon and Baird argue that the (log of 
the) number of districts per county is directly 
related to the competitiveness of the teacher 
labor market. Since the downstate New York 
counties have, by far, the highest number of 
districts apiece in the state, DWN can be viewed 
simply as a dichotomized version of the Landon 
and Baird variable. See, Landon and Baird, 
"Monopsony in the Market for Public School 
Teachers," pp. 967-969. 
22 A l t h o u g h the re is a posit ive corre la t ion be-
tween DWN a n d t h e wea l th va r iab le consid-
ered here ( t rue va lue pe r pup i l ) , it is no t h igh 
e n o u g h to cause a p r o b l e m of mul t ico l l inear i ty . 
23 Owen, " T o w a r d a P u b i c E m p l o y m e n t W a g e 
Theory: Econometric Evidence on Teacher 
Quality," p . 216. 
teacher bargaining, and it will be seen 
that our results do not support the 
contention that a few strong organized 
districts lift the salaries of all districts 
in the area. Also, this argument would 
be more persuasive if the downstate 
differential had not existed in the pre-
bargaining era, as it clearly did. 
Thus, the downstate advantage is 
probably the result of the more com-
petitive labor market conditions in that 
area, and, any analysis of teacher sala-
ries in New York should allow for this 
differential. 
The Regression Models 
The first variant of the model tested 
is completed by the addition of a union 
variable, CTRCT, which takes a value 
of 1 if a district had a contract for the 
year 1968-69, and 0 otherwise.24 
In summary, the first model tested 
takes the form: 
(1) S = b0 + b1 (P/T) + b2E -b3 E* 
+ btADV+ biSENS 
+ fi6 DWN + b1 CTRCT + e 
S is the salary variable; e is the error 
term; and the other variables have pre-
viously been defined. Note that the pre-
ceding discussion leads to some uncer-
tainty concerning the signs of bx and 65. 
Essentially, this first model consists of 
structural characteristics (Pj T, E, DWN), 
teacher characteristics (ADV, SEN 3), 
and the contract variable. 
A second, extended version of the 
model is also reported here. Added to 
Equation 1 are variables representing 
the district's ability to pay and its will-
ingness to pay. A common and accepted 
measure of ability to pay is "true value 
2-1 Approximately 70 districts engaged in some 
form of negotiations in 1968 but did not sign 
contracts. 
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per pupil" (7T/P).2 5 True value is an 
estimate (admittedly, often a poor one) 
of the market value of the property in 
a school district. Since school revenues 
are based primarily on local property 
taxes, the value of a district's property 
wealth behind each pupil is considered 
a good index of ability to pay. 
There is generally less agreement on 
the appropriate index for a district's 
willingness to pay. David B. Ross has 
suggested, "An idea of the effort a com-
munity has made to supply public serv-
ices comes from comparing its ability to 
pay, measured by its taxable resources, 
and the amount of tax revenues which 
actually have been collected and spent 
on services."26 Following Ross's lead, 
this study considers the ratio of current 
expenditures to true value a useful meas-
ure of a district's "willingness to pay" or 
"effort." 27 Current expenditures are de-
fined as instructional costs (IC), and the 
following identity is noted: 
IC _ TV IC 
P = P ' TV 
25
 Charles S. Benson, The Economics of Public 
Education, 2d ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 
1968), p. 111. Other labels for the same concept 
are "full value," "fair value," "fair market 
value," and "actual value." 
ae David B. Ross, "The Arbitration of Public 
Employee Wage Disputes," Industrial and Labor 
Relations Review, Vol. 23, No. 1 (October 1969), 
p . 6. For further discussion, see John E. Drot-
ning and David B. Lipsky, "The Outcome of 
Impasse Procedures in New York Schools Under 
the Taylor Law," Arbitration Journal, Vol. 26, 
No. 2, 1971, pp. 95-99. 
27
 Landon and Baird, "Monopsony in the 
Market for Public School Teachers," pp. 968-
969, use the "effective property tax rate" as 
their measure of willingness to pay. This is 
sometimes called "tax on true," and is equal to 
property tax revenue divided by true value 
(xl.OOO). Thus, the difference between our 
measure of "effort" and Landon and Baird's is 
a question of the relation of instructional costs 
to property tax revenue. For example, in 1969 in 
New York, property revenue was approximately 
$2.1 million and instructional costs were $2.6 
million. 
Hence, it can be argued that the level 
of instructional costs per pupil reflects 
both a district's ability and its willing-
ness to pay. It might be noted that the 
simple correlation between TV/P and 
IC/TV is insignificant for New York 
school districts and slightly negative 
(r = — .086). Nevertheless, it is hypothe-
sized that both TV/P and IC/TV will 
have a positive influence on salaries. 
The final variable tested in the ex-
tended version of the model is debt 
service per pupil (DEBT/P). The addi-
tion of DEBT/P gives a more compre-
hensive picture of the true costs of edu-
cating a district's pupils.28 School dis-
tricts are limited, for the most part, to 
using borrowed funds for capital ex-
penditures. It is expected that DEBT/P 
will have a positive influence on teacher 
salaries. Two reasons are suggested for 
this relation. First, a district with a high 
DEBT/P is likely to have undertaken 
a school building program in the recent 
past. New buildings may result in a 
higher quality system or an expanded 
system, both results calling for addi-
tional teachers and thus being likely to 
have a positive influence on salaries. 
Second, to the extent that new buildings 
are financed with borrowed funds rather 
than current tax revenues, the amount 
of tax revenue available for teacher 
salaries is not diminished, at least in the 
short run. 
The hypothesis is that a high DEBT/P 
indicates a system that is growing or 
being improved, and this creates upward 
pressure on salaries. Obviously, the ex-
28 The sum of IC/P and DEBT/P, however, 
does not equal total expenditures per pupil. 
Omitted are items such as expenses related to 
the board of education and central administra-
tion, building maintenance expenses, and "un-
distributed" expenses. IC/P and DEBT/P com-
bined average about 80 percent of total ex-
penditures per pupil. 
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istence of debt service in a district's 
budget may reflect borrowings made 
many years in the past. Yet, given the 
rapid acceleration of both construction 
costs and interest rates in the 1960s, a 
high DEBT J P almost inevitably reflects 
recent bond issues. 
The extended model takes the form: 
(2) S = b0 + 61 (P/T) + b2E-b3E* 
+ btADV+ bhSEN5 
+ beDWN+b7CTRCT 
+ b8 (TVIP) + h (IC/TV) 
+ b10 (DEBT/P) + e 
The extended model adds variables 
denoting the district's costs of producing 
a student, i.e., the "price of the product." 
The first model, then, is built on assump-
tions about the operation of the labor 
market, and the second adds "product" 
market variables. 
Regression Results 
Results from cross-sectional analyses 
of the two models, using data from 
almost 700 New York state school dis-
tricts, are displayed in Table 2. In gen-
eral, the models test out well. About 45 
to 60 percent of the variance in the de-
pendent variables is explained. Note that 
the addition of the three financial or 
"product" market variables does not add 
much to the R2. In fact, for each of the 
three points from the salary schedule, 
about one percentage point is added to 
the variance explained; for mean salary, 
about three percentage points are added 
to R2. On the other hand, the coefficients 
of the three financial variables are, for 
the most part, significant and operate in 
the expected direction. Teacher salaries 
do appear to depend on both the dis-
trict's ability and willingness to pay. 
DEBT/P is significant in all cases. True 
value per pupil and DEBT/P are par-
ticularly significant in the case of mean 
salary. Every $1,000 increase in TV/P 
adds $8 to average salary. A $1.00 in-
crease in debt service per pupil is asso-
ciated with an increase of $1.80 in aver-
age salary. The willingness to pay vari-
able, IC/TV, has a significant impact on 
the salary scale, but it apparently plays 
no role in determining mean salaries. A 
district's willingness to pay must be de-
termined through the political process. 
Community political preferences are ap-
parently more likely to be reflected in 
the salary schedule than in average 
salaries paid. 
Note also that the pupil-teacher ratio, 
P/T, is positively and significantly re-
lated to mean salaries, but negatively 
and insignificantly related (except for 
BS + 60, 11th Step) to the salary scale. 
An extra pupil per teacher adds about 
eighty dollars to average salary and, in 
a sense, this is a reward for higher pro-
ductivity. On the other hand, high salary 
schedules are generally associated with 
low P/T ratios. If P/T is a measure of 
quality, it is reflected in the salary 
schedule, not in terms of salaries actually 
received by teachers. One can infer from 
these results that districts with high stu-
dent-faculty ratios tend to have low 
salary schedules but older teachers. 
Enrollment has the expected relation 
to the salary scale but not to average 
salary. Salaries in the schedule increase 
with district size but at a diminishing 
rate. The highest salaries at the BS + 60, 
11th Step, for example, seem to be asso-
ciated with districts with about 25,000 
pupils. At about 50,000 pupils, the net 
effect of enrollment on salaries is zero.29 
This is an example of the turnaround 
effect. At lower steps in the salary scale, 
29
 Aside from New York City, the only dis-
trict with more than 50,000 pupils is Buffalo. 
Table 2. Regression Coefficients for Determinants of Teacher 
Salaries in New York State, 1968. 
Independent 
Variable 
P/T 
E 
E* 
ADV 
SENS 
DWN 
CTRCT 
TV/P 
IC/TV 
DEBT IP 
Constant 
R' 
Standard 
error of 
estimate 
Base 
Basic Model 
- 2 . 7 8 0 
(2.388) 
.0142 
( .0035)*** 
- . 0 1 6 1 
(.0071)** 
1.7431 
( .952)* 
.7124 
(.8797) 
414.58 
(25.92)*** 
4.951 
(17.784) 
6,261.42 
.537 
198.10 
Salary 
Extended Model 
- 2 . 9 6 9 
(2.381) 
.0137 
( .0035)*** 
- . 0 1 5 2 
(.0071)** 
1.6784 
( .973)* 
.5543 
(.8819) 
403.88 
(26.79)*** 
5.523 
(17.755) 
.0003 
(.0005) 
.0216 
( .0088)** 
.2743 
(.1283)** 
6,242.22 8 
.547 
196.59 
Dependent 
BS + 30, 7th Step 
Basic Model 
- 9 . 9 0 2 
(7.160) 
.0335 
( .0071)*** 
- . 0 4 8 0 
( .0140)*** 
8.3823 
(1.905)*** 
7.7724 
(1.7995)*** 
842.06 
(52.71)*** 
.4888 
(36.924) 
,217.02 8 
.615 
396.30 
Extended Model 
- 7 . 8 2 7 
(7.215) 
.0332 
( .0072)*** 
- . 0 4 6 4 
( .0140)*** 
7.6405 
(1.971)*** 
7.5011 
(1.8023)*** 
806.28 1 
(53.86)*** 
7.953 
(36.717) 
.0018 
( .0011)* 
.0318 
( .0169)* 
.6934 
( .2680)*** 
:,111.54 8 
.625 
392.48 
Variable 
BS + 60, 
Baste Model 
- 1 5 . 8 6 6 
(9.330)* 
.0539 
( .0137)*** 
- .1028 
(.0279)*** 
23.441 
(3.722)*** 
17.093 
(3.438)*** 
,157.81 ] 
(101.30)*** 
- 1 2 . 8 3 2 
(69.497) 
11th Step 
Extended Model 
- 1 4 . 8 1 8 
(9.320)* 
.0557 
( .0138)*** 
- .1042 
(.0279)*** 
21.560 
(3.807)*** 
17.214 
(3.452)*** 
1,157.81 
(104.87)*** 
- 2 . 5 9 2 
(69.489) 
.0044 
(.0019)** 
.0569 
( .0344)* 
.6951 
(.4020)* 
,995.95 8,881.33 
.526 
774.15 
.535 
769.45 
Mean 
Basic Model 
79.971 
(10.212)*** 
- . 0 0 9 3 
(.0150) 
- . 0 3 5 3 
(.0305) 
41.280 
(4.074)*** 
- .1021 
(3.763) 
843.98 
(110.88)*** 
3.419 
(76.068) 
5,080.44 
.442 
847.34 
: Salary 
Extended Model 
83.460 
(10.052)*** 
- . 0 0 8 7 
(.0149) 
- .0334 
(.0301) 
37.545 
(4.106)*** 
- . 2 0 2 2 
(3.7227) 
691.53 
(113.10)*** 
6.527 
(74.945) 
.0080 
( .0021)*** 
.0013 
(.0371) 
1.807 
( .5414)*** 
4.853.75 
.474 
829.86 
H 
X 
w 
Z 
r1 
c w 
Z 
o w 
o 
*rl 
n o 
r 
r w 
o 
H 
1—t 
< 
w 
> 
> 
1—( 
z 
o 
***Signincantat/> < .01. 
•'Significant at p < .05. 
•Significant atp < .10. 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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however, the turnaround occurs only at 
an enrollment level that is outside the 
range of districts included in this study. 
Large central city districts may be re-
quired to pay higher starting salaries to 
compensate teachers for the disutilities 
associated with urban schools. More ex-
perienced teachers, however, may receive 
relatively lower salaries in urban dis-
tricts. This implies that the salary struc-
ture in city districts may be more com-
pressed than in outlying, suburban 
districts. 
The variable ADV is significantly re-
lated to each of the dependent variables, 
but particularly to BS + 60, 11th Step 
and to mean salary. The Beta coefficients 
(not shown in Table 2) reveal that ADV 
is the single most influential variable 
for mean salary, the second most impor-
tant variable for BS + 60, 11th Step. A 
high proportion of teachers with ad-
vanced degrees pulls up the entire salary 
schedule, even base salary. This might 
be called a reverse bumping effect. Of 
course, the impact is much greater at the 
higher steps and greatest in the case of 
mean salary. An increase of 10 percent-
age points in ADV adds an estimated 
$375 to $413 to mean salary. 
SEN 3 is insignificant in the case of 
base and mean salary. A high proportion 
of young teachers does appear to be asso-
ciated with an increase in the higher 
steps in the schedule. This effect is some-
what unexpected, but not perverse. Per-
haps young teachers have long time 
horizons and are attracted to districts 
paying higher salaries at the higher steps. 
A growing district will probably have a 
high proportion of young teachers, and 
growth may put upward pressure on all 
points in the salary scale.30 
30
 The simple correlation between SEN 3 and 
DEBT/P, however, is only .14. 
The favorable salary differential en-
joyed by downstate districts is quite sub-
stantial, even when other variables are 
controlled for. The DWN differential 
ranges from about $400 at base to $1,100 
at BS + 60, 11th Step. To some extent, 
downstate districts are purchasing more 
qualified teachers: the simple correlation 
between DWN and ADV is .61; this is 
the only point in the model at which a 
problem of multicollinearity exists. 
Finally, it is clear that the model's 
measure of the effects of collective bar-
gaining, CTRCT, has no significant rela-
tion to teacher salaries. The small size 
of the coefficients and the large standard 
errors indicate that the apparent differ-
ences displayed in Table 1 are largely 
illusory—they are accounted for by other 
variables. 
The evidence from this regression 
analysis would indicate that collective 
bargaining has no impact on salaries, but 
certain factors must be kept in mind in 
drawing any conclusions. First, the vari-
able CTRCT is certainly not the only, 
and may not be the best, way of measur-
ing the effects of bargaining. If it were 
possible, for example, to distinguish be-
tween "weak" and "strong" teacher 
unions, more meaningful results might 
be obtained. Such distinctions are dif-
ficult to draw and were not feasible for 
this study. Second, and more important, 
spillover effects may be blurring union 
impact and these can be corrected for, 
at least in part. 
Spillover Effects 
The existence of genuine collective 
bargaining in 60 percent of the districts 
in New York state in 1968 may have 
heavily influenced salary schedules 
among the 40 percent that were not effec-
tively organized; that is, districts without 
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formal negotiations and contracts may 
have chosen or been forced to follow 
the lead of organized districts and set 
their own salaries as if they were orga-
nized. It is well known that patterns are 
pervasive in public school bargaining.31 
Unorganized districts may have been just 
as subject to the leadership of pattern-
setters as organized districts. Labor mar-
ket pressures may have forced a district 
to match what its neighbors were paying 
or risk being unable to recruit and retain 
the teachers it needed. Districts wishing 
to avoid negotiations with a teacher 
organization may have elected to set 
salaries in line with comparable orga-
nized districts. All of this implies that if 
spillover effects are significant, the im-
pact of the union will be seriously under-
stated. 
If spillover is a problem, how can its 
effects be corrected for? Assume that the 
amount of spillover is a function of the 
geographic proximity of school districts; 
that is, spillover will be greater among 
districts that are spatially clustered. A 
district that is isolated geographically 
will be relatively immune to pattern 
effects. The experience of the parties in 
negotiations provides some prima facie 
evidence to support this assumption: 
when comparisons are used as a standard 
for salary determination, it is inevitably 
nearby or adjacent districts that are used 
for the purpose. The more distant the 
district, the less relevance it has for the 
parties. 
Earlier, it was argued that the spatial 
concentration of districts is a correlate 
of labor market competition; that is, 
spillover and competitiveness go hand-
31 Richard Pegnetter, "Fact Finding and 
Teacher Salary Disputes: The 1969 Experience 
in New York State," Industrial and Labor Re-
lations Review, Vol. 24, No. 2 (January 1971), 
pp. 226-242. 
in-hand. In practice, it may be impossible 
to determine which effect accounts for a 
given salary pattern. 
These considerations suggest a method 
of correcting for spillover. If a subsample 
consisting of relatively isolated districts 
can be selected, the influence of spillover 
will be reduced, if not eliminated. 
Furthermore, such a sample would con-
sist of districts operating in less competi-
tive, more monopsonistic labor markets. 
For example, a sample might be con-
structed consisting only of small-town 
districts or districts within a given en-
rollment range—that is, those relatively 
uninfluenced by geographically proxi-
mate districts and therefore less involved 
in any "orbit of coercive comparison." 
Table 3 presents the results of running 
the basic model for districts with enroll-
ments of 1,001 to 2,000 pupils. There 
are 188 districts in the sample, most of 
which are small, upstate communities, at 
some distance from major metropolitan 
areas. (Only 12 percent are downstate 
districts.) About 63 percent of these dis-
tricts were organized in 1968, matching 
the extent of organization among all 
districts in the state. These small dis-
tricts, however, tended to be poorer (the 
mean TV/P is $ 19,800) and to have 
larger average pupil-teacher ratios 
(P/T = 22.0) than the average district 
in the state. The willingness ratio, 
IC/TVj also tended to be lower than the 
average for the state. 
The most interesting result shown in 
Table 3 is the significant effect unionism 
appears to have on salaries; CTRCT is 
associated with $72 more on base to $313 
more for BS + 60, 11th Step. In per-
centage terms, dividing the CTRCT co-
efficients by the (unweighted) means of 
each of the dependent variables for dis-
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Table 3. Regression Coefficients for Determinants of Teacher Salaries in New 
York State Districts with Enrollments of 1,001 to 2,000 Pupils, 1968. 
Independent Variable 
P/T 
ADV 
SEN 3 
DWN 
CTRCT 
TV/P 
DEBT IP 
Constant 
R2 
Standard error of 
estimate 
"""'Significant atp < 
"•'Significant at p < 
Base Salary 
- 1 2 . 8 0 8 
(2.897)*** 
- 6 . 2 3 1 0 
(2.034)*** 
.1264 
(1.529) 
405.31 
(60.09)*** 
72.116 
(28.046)*** 
.00059 
(.0014) 
- .1866 
(.2256) 
6,885.36 
.522 
160.43 
.01. 
.05. 
Dependent 
BS + 30, 
7th Step 
- 3 4 . 8 4 3 
(6.127)*** 
- 3 . 2 2 6 1 
(4.302) 
5.3414 
(3.233)* 
793.15 
(127.08)*** 
190.515 
(59.315)*** 
.00185 
(.00295) 
- . 4 6 1 1 
(.4772) 
9,447.50 
.647 
339.30 
Variable 
BS + 60, 
11th Step 
- 4 7 . 9 5 6 
(9.649)*** 
.1198 
(6.775) 
8.6006 
(5.092)* 
1,267.71 
(200.13)*** 
313.253 
(93.410)*** 
.00217 
(.0047) 
- . 6 9 2 4 
(.7515) 
11,134.96 
.666 
534.34 
Mean Salary 
1.9467 
(12.815) 
32.328 
(8.998)*** 
- 6 . 4 1 0 4 
(6.763) 
660.05 
(265.78)*** 
210.511 
(124.057)* 
.00380 
(.0062) 
.7159 
(.9981) 
7,192.21 
.488 
709.65 
*Significant at/> < .10. 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
tricts in the sample results in the follow-
ing: 
Salary Level Percentage 
Base salary 1.12 
BS + 30, 7th step 2.15 
BS + 60, 11th step 2.95 
Mean salary 2.41 
These union differentials are similar 
to, bu t slightly higher than, the differen-
tials shown in the third column of Tab le 
1. Of course, in the analysis represented 
in Tab le 3, other variables influencing 
salaries are controlled for, making the 
results far more meaningful. However, 
al though the CTRCT regression coeffi-
cients are significant in a statistical sense, 
a 2 percent union differential is not 
likely to affect substantially the alloca-
tion of resources within a district. On 
the other hand, since the test employed 
here does not entirely eliminate spill-
over, the union effect may be under-
stated. 
T h e R2s in Tab le 3 are also similar 
to those in Tab le 2. The re are differences 
in how the model works with this par-
ticular sample. For example, the coeffi-
cients for the financial variables are not 
significant. Ability to pay and DEBT/P 
do not appear to influence salary deter-
minat ion in these districts.32 If these dis-
tricts do have greater monopsony power, 
they have greater discretion in setting 
salaries, regardless of financial indices of 
"ability" and "willingness." 
I t is significant that the IC/TV rat io 
was lower, on the average, for these dis-
tricts than for the state as a whole. Th i s 
implies that the districts were not exert-
32 The "willingness" ratio, IC/TV, was tested 
in earlier runs but was not included in Table 
3. 
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ing themselves to the same extent that 
other districts, both larger and smaller, 
were. In a sense, these districts were col-
lecting monopsony rents. Under these 
circumstances, it is not surprising that 
collective bargaining appears to be more 
influential in this sample than elsewhere. 
Teachers organized for genuine bargain-
ing can force monopsonistic districts 
to behave as price-takers in the labor 
market, rather than discretionary price-
setters. In this way, the teachers can ex-
tricate some of the "economic rent" for 
themselves. Bargaining forces these dis-
tricts into bilateral monopoly, in which 
power factors play a large role. At the 
same time, spillover effects are reduced, 
since the districts are scattered and rela-
tively isolated. 
It should be noted that the basic 
model was tested against other sub-
samples. When run on all districts with 
1,000 or fewer pupils (N = 235), the co-
efficient for the CTRCT variable, with 
one exception, was not significant. The 
one exception was the BS + 60, 11 th 
Step. CTRCT was significant at the .05 
level; the coefficient was $410, almost 
4 percent of the mean salary at that level. 
At other salary levels, the coefficient 
ranged from $32 to $149, but the stan-
dard errors were too large to make the 
results significant. 
These small, largely rural districts 
might be considered to have potentially 
as much monopsony power as those dis-
tricts with 1,001 to 2,000 pupils and 
therefore to present the same prospects 
for union gains. In 1968, however, only 
36 percent of these districts had con-
tracts. Furthermore, in the districts where 
the teachers had organized, bargaining 
was largely unsophisticated; the contract 
was a simple document, seldom more 
than a few pages in length; and effective 
control often remained with the board 
of education. It is probable that, given 
the rapid extension of bargaining through 
1969 and 1970 and the growing sophisti-
cation of negotiators on both sides, a 
strong union effect might be found in 
the smallest districts if data for 1970 or 
1971 were to be tested. 
For districts with more than 2,000 
pupils, no significant CTRCT variables 
were discovered—the results being 
roughly equivalent to those in Table 2. 
Furthermore, no significant effects were 
found when upstate and downstate dis-
tricts were divided and tested separately. 
Changes in Salary Levels, 1967-68 
This section deals with the relation of 
collective bargaining to salary changes 
that occurred between 1967 and 1968. 
Table 4 shows that teachers who ob-
tained collective agreements in 1968 
seemed to win larger salary increases 
than teachers who did not have such 
contracts. For example, base salary in-
creased by an average of $598 in districts 
with contracts in 1968 compared to $558 
in districts without contracts. Base salary 
Table 4. Changes in Salary Levels, 1967-68: Differences Between New 
York School Districts with and without Collective Bargaining Contracts. 
Salary Level 
Base salary 
BS + 30, 7th step 
BS + 60, 11th step 
Districts with Contracts 
(N = 441) 
Mean Standard Deviation 
$598 $211.7 
782 297.6 
986 410.2 
Districts wi 
Mean 
$558 
704 
871 
(N 
•thout Contracts 
= 225) 
Standard Deviation 
$293.4 
402.2 
521.0 
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Table 5. Regression Coefficients for Determinants of Changes in Teacher 
Salaries in New York State, 1967-68. 
Independent Variables 
E 
E* 
ADV 
SEN 3 
MALES 
DWN 
CTRCT 
Constant 
R* 
Standard error of estimate 
Change in 
Base Salary 
.0059 
(.0043) 
.0075 
(.0083) 
-3.6752 
(1.111)*** 
-2.0562 
(1.070)** 
.2106 
(.1259)* 
-12.730 
(30.936) 
83.039 
(21.573)*** 
655.924 
.070 
244.10 
Dependent Variables 
Change in 
BS + 30, 7th Step 
.0138 
(.0060)** 
- .0019 
(.0117) 
-2.9907 
(1.512)** 
-1.0098 
(1.510) 
.4415 
(.1762)** 
-9.652 
(43.373) 
109.837 
(30.259)*** 
624.149 
.063 
340.53 
Change in 
BS + 60, 11th Step 
.0247 
(.0080)*** 
- .0173 
(.0156) 
- .6030 
(2.087) 
- .4498 
(2.004) 
.5276 
(.2360)** 
-2.4482 
(58.231) 
130.591 
(40.660)*** 
582.519 
.066 
453.77 
•••Significant a.tp < .01. 
••Significant at/> < .05. 
•Significant at/> < .10. 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
averaged $5,887 in 1967 in districts that 
won contracts in 1968; in 1968, the base 
salary of these districts averaged $6,485. 
In unorganized districts, base salary 
averaged $5,862 in 1967 and $6,420 in 
1968. 
Once again, however, other variables 
influencing salary changes need to be 
controlled for. Therefore, the basic 
model was tested to determine if salary 
changes, rather than salary levels, might 
have been influenced by the presence of 
a collective bargaining contract. The 
movement of salaries from year to year is 
probably susceptible to a number of 
transient and random factors. Short-term 
changes cannot be explained so neatly 
by a reasonably compact model of the 
type used to analyze salary levels. It 
turned out that factors such as ability 
to pay, willingness to pay, and average 
class size were not related to salary 
changes. The most interesting results of 
the analysis are shown in Table 5. Al-
though only 6 or 7 percent of the vari-
ance in salary changes is explained by 
the regressions, in each case CTRCT is 
a highly significant variable. 
The results indicate that the presence 
of a contract added about $83 to the 
amount by which base salary was in-
creased from 1967 to 1968. The corres-
ponding figures, are $110 at the BS + 30, 
7th Step and $131 at the BS + 60, 11th 
Step. Thus, collective bargaining ap-
parently resulted in salary increases that 
were approximately 15 percent greater 
than one would have expected other-
wise.33 
33 If the coefficient, $83, is divided by the 
average increase in base salary in unorganized 
districts ($558), the result is 14.8 percent. At the 
BS + 30, 7th Step, dividing $110 by $704 gives 
15.6 percent; at the BS fr 60, 11th Step, $131 
divided by $871 equals ra.O percent. 
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One variable not previously included 
in the analysis also appears to have in-
fluenced salary changes. MALES, the 
percentage of males in a district's teacher 
work force, had a positive and significant 
impact on salary changes. ADV is signifi-
cant in two equations in Table 5, but 
unexpectedly it was negatively related to 
the dependent variables. Enrollment, E, 
is positively related to salary changes, 
and significant in two equations, but E-
is not significant. Apparently, there is no 
urban turnaround effect with respect to 
salary changes. DWN, an important fac-
tor in explaining salary levels, is insig-
nificant here. 
Given the low RH and relatively high 
standard errors of estimate, the equa-
tions in Table 5 would not be useful for 
predictive purposes. Important variables 
may have been missed, and CTRCT may 
have captured some of the effects of these 
omitted variables. Nevertheless, the 
available evidence suggests that collec-
tive bargaining did result in larger 
negotiated increases in the salary scale 
than teachers would have gained in the 
absence of organization. 
Comparisons with Other Studies 
Table 6 summarizes the principal 
studies now available on the influence 
of collective bargaining on teacher 
salaries. The table is virtually self-
explanatory, although it provides no 
justification for the various regression 
models used by the several authors. In 
examining the table, one notices that the 
models have certain common variables. 
For example, district size is an explana-
tory variable in three studies. Each study 
has used an income or wealth variable, 
usually to serve as a proxy for ability to 
pay. The pupil-teacher ratio has also 
been considered by several authors. 
A comparison of the conclusions 
reached through the various studies 
shows that the union variable was found 
to be statistically significant in the 
Thornton and the Hall and Carroll 
studies, but not significant in Rasper's 
research. The results are mixed in the 
study by Landon and Pierce and also in 
the present study, depending on (1) the 
dependent variable tested, (2) the spe-
cification of the union variable, and (3) 
the construction of the sample. It is 
more interesting to compare the range 
of the union effect in the various studies. 
Despite other differences, the percentage 
figures fall mainly into a rather narrow 
range, hovering between 2 and 4 per-
cent. Kasper, for example, finds that 
teacher organizations increased average 
salaries by a maximum of about 4 per-
cent. Landon and Pierce find almost no 
union effect in two tests but a maximum 
of 4.9 percent in a third. Thorton finds 
the effect to be between 1 and 4 percent, 
except for the "AM maximum" salary 
level in which the effect is a staggering 
(and unconvincing) 29 percent. Hall and 
Carroll's best estimate is just under 2 
percent. The largest effect on salary 
level found in this study is just under 
3 percent; without any correction for 
spillover, the effect is zero. 
Thus, additional research has served 
to reinforce Rasper's initial findings, at 
least in terms of the magnitude of the 
union effect. As Rasper put it, "Given 
these small estimates, it seems unlikely 
that bargaining has produced a signifi-
cant or widespread reallocation of edu-
cational resources." 34 
At the same time, it is hazardous to 
predict what the effect of teacher union-
ism will be in the future. This study's 
34 Kasper, "The Effects of Collective Bargain-
ing on Public School Teachers' Salaries," p. 71. 
Table 6. A Comparison of Studies of the Influence of Collective Bargaining on Teacher Salaries. 
Matrix Kasper 
Study 
London & Pierce Thornton Hall & Carroll Lipsky & Drotning 
Unit of 
observation 
Size of sample 
Year(s) examined 
Dependent 
variable(s) 
Significant 
independent 
variables 
"Union" 
variable(s) 
All states (including 
D.C.) 
51 
1967-68 
Average salary in state 
Per capita income, 
urbanization, per-
centage local revenue, 
expenditures per pupil 
(1) Percentage 
teachers represented by 
organization, (2) per-
centage of districts with 
representation, (3) 
percentage of teachers 
School districts with 
enrollments of 25,000 
to 50,000, all of U.S. 
44 
1966-67 
Beginning salary 
(BS minimum) 
Number of districts in 
area, per capita in-
come, percentage 
revenue from local 
sources 
(1) Dummy variable 
(1 = negotiations 
held), (2) percentage 
teachers members of 
NEA, (3) percentage 
teachers members of 
School districts in 
cities with more than 
100,000 population, all 
of U.S. 
83 
1969-70 
BS minimum 
BS maximum 
AM minimum 
AM maximum 
District size, average 
wage in area 
Dummy variable (1 = 
collective bargaining 
contract) 
Elementary school 
districts in Cook 
County, Illinois 
118 
1968-69 
Average salary in 
district 
District size, median 
family income, per-
centage male teachers, 
average seniority, 
state-aid per pupil as 
percentage of per pupil 
expenditures 
Dummy variable (1 = 
collective bargaining 
contract) 
All school districts in New 
York state (except New 
York City) 
696 
1967-68 
BS minimum (base) 
BS + 30, 7th step 
BS + 6 0 , 11th step 
Average salary, also, changes 
in these salaries 1967-68 
District size, percentage 
teachers with advanced 
degrees, percentage teachers 
with 3 or fewer years service, 
pupil teacher ratio, true 
value per pupil, "effort" 
ratio, debt service per pupil 
Dummy variable (1 = collec-
tive bargaining contract) 
o 
C/3 
H 
> r 
> 
I -1 
> w 
o 
t—t 
> 
H 
1—l o 
2: 
'Union" effect 
covered by agreements 
Insignificant-adds 0 to 
about 4 percent 
AFT 
(1) Dummy variable 
significant—adds 
about 4.9 percent 
(2) percentage NEA: 
barely significant (3) 
percentage AFT 
insignificant 
Significant—adds from 
2.3 to 28.8 percent 
Significant—adds 
about 1.8 percent 
(1) Effect in entire sample 
insignificant, (2) effect in 
"small town" sample sig-
nificant, (3) effect on salary 
change significant. Adds 0 to 3 
percent to salary levels, 15 
percent to salary changes 
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finding that bargaining added about 15 
percent to salary increases, although 
subject to certain caveats, indicates that 
over time the cumulative effect of teach-
er bargaining might cause a substantial 
reallocation of educational resources. If 
the conclusion reached by Paul Douglas 
can be applied to the public sector, how-
ever, it seeems unlikely that organized 
teachers can sustain their relative ad-
vantage into the indefinite future. 
Summary and Conclusion 
This study has been based on a model 
that makes certain assumptions about 
the teacher labor market. The model's 
independent variables included teacher 
characteristics, structural factors, and fi-
nancial variables, as well as a dummy 
variable representing the "bargaining 
effect." The dependent variables in-
cluded both mean salary and rates taken 
from the salary schedule. 
The model was first tested against all 
New York state school districts (exclud-
ing those in New York City) for the 
year 1968, the first year in which the 
Taylor Law was in effect. Collective 
bargaining was found to have had no 
effect on teacher salary levels, regardless 
of whether the dependent variable was 
a measure of actual earnings (mean 
salary) or of scheduled rates. 
In an attempt to correct for spillover 
effects, the model was tested on certain 
subsamples of New York districts. For 
districts with enrollments between 1,001 
and 2,000 pupils—essentially small town 
districts—the union effect was positive 
and significant for both types of salary 
measure. We argue that these districts 
were both relatively isolated from spill-
over and had a certain amount of mon-
opsony power, so that a positive bargain-
ing effect is more likely here than else-
where. 
Finally, estimates were made of the 
effect of collective bargaining on salary 
changes from 1967 to 1968, and the bar-
gaining effect once again was found to 
be positive and highly significant, add-
ing about 15 percent to salary increases. 
Teacher unionism initially came to 
New York districts in which slightly 
higher salaries were already being paid. 
The effect of bargaining in the first year 
of the Taylor Law was to increase the 
favorable differential already enjoyed by 
the newly organized districts. The effect 
was probably greatest in small town, 
upstate districts, especially at the higher 
salary steps. The magnitude of the bar-
gaining effect even at the eleventh step, 
however, was probably not more than 3 
percent. For the state as a whole, with-
out any correction for spillover, the 
salary effect of teacher unions was not 
significantly different from zero. 
